Playing out the numbers game of a nine county Northern Ireland

Could nine counties have worked for Ulster Unionists?

That’s the question that historian Samuel Beckton posed himself in his new book ‘The Unbroken Covenant’.

While partition came into force in 1920, leaving the six counties in the United Kingdom, the heavily drawn in pencil line only became indelible mark on the landscape with the conclusion of the Boundary Commission in 1925. A century on, Dr Beckton notes that the idea wasn’t as fanciful as we may now suppose.

“The British government nearly selected a nine county option originally in 1919, 1920 in the Walter Long committee when they were drawing up the Government of Ireland Act.

“The reason they wanted to choose this is because they thought if partition happened it would more likely lead to reunification under a nine county state than a six county - this was favoured by the British Government. Also they thought it would bring more balance as well. Also some unionists favoured it as well,” he says quite surprisingly.

“In the end it was not selected even though a lot of six county unionists wanted it, including the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council who voted in favour of a nine county option.”

The benefits of including Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan in the Northern Ireland State would be a stronger economy, making use of the extensive railway links, and also, significantly border security.

“Some people wanted the inclusion of Donegal alone just for the border - because you would have reduced the northern border by a third - just with the inclusion of Donegal alone.”

In this book Samuel, who has a doctorate in history, embraced the counter-factual topic of how unionists would have tried to operate in a nine county Ulster/Northern Ireland for the 25 years after partition to the end of World War 2.

“This is based on the 1911 census, PRONI records, looking at documents from Ulster unionists as well as examples from what happened in our own timeline. So this is based on academic assumptions,” said the Yorkshire man who now lives in Belfast, of the project which swallowed a decade of his life on and off.

Poring over census data Samuel sought to redraw electoral boundaries in Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan to favour unionists in these counties; essentially applying the gerrymandering techniques that were actually employed by Stormont officials in the six counties.

“I looked at old PRONI records of how Fermanagh and Tyrone were redrawn. It was quite graphic in some areas - sometimes they were drawing them as ‘Rebel Areas’.”

“Altogether there’s roughly 6,000 townlands combined for Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan; just for County Cavan alone, there’s 1,985 townlands and I had to go through the 1911 census and check every townland and every street on that census,” he explains.

Although it was a fascinating subject, he found replicating the warped machinations of civil servants in redrawing District Electoral Divisions to deny nationalists a political voice deeply unsettling.

“I personally found it difficult, not just in terms of finding what scheme would work practically, but it was ethically challenging as well, as gerrymandering may be politically effective, but it is widely recognised as all too often a notorious abuse undermining democracy,” he stresses, acknowledging the suffering of northern nationalists.

“It’s fascinating because you got for once into the mindset of the civil service at the time who were tasked to do this – you just think to yourself, is this right? What kind of mindset must you have just to see people as numbers and then justify what you were doing? No matter what your political persuasion was, at some point if your party has to do that to win, are you sure your party is truly the good guys?”

As to managing any nationalist backlash in the three southern counties, he considered techniques used in Fermanagh and Tyrone.

“Appointing Commissions on councils they can control, restructuring of the police and security services, the Security Acts so even monuments to the IRA for instance couldn’t be erected despite being funded from America and being approved by local council. There’s lots of factors that went through all this that I went into depth, most of which I found quite disgusting.”

According to the 1911 census in County Cavan protestants made up 18% of the population.

He notes it’s possible that some Cavan councils could have returned unionist majorities if nationalists chose to boycott elections, as happened in the nationalist stronghold of Newry Council in 1924.

“Nationalists refused to stand for election. They thought the new northern state wouldn’t last very long so they would abstain. They thought that by refusing, they would rob legitimacy from the northern government and its councils,” he said surmising it was possible nationalists in southern Ulster counties may have likewise boycotted elections leaving the path clear for unionists to seize power.

“These would lasted until the mid-’30s and then afterwards unionists would just lose them again.”

Reflecting on his findings he regards “the biggest surprise” is Ulster Unionists in the border counties would not have gained electorally as much as they thought.

“Once first past the post returned for Stormont elections in 1929, they would have suffered,” he says in terms of electoral representation.

“If we look at [Independent candidate and member of the local protestant association. John James Cole for instance, in all the polls from 1923 to 1957, standing in Irish General Elections in Cavan, he consistently managed to get returned. But then, it’s only when the boundaries are changed after the 1960 election that he could no longer get returned.”

John James Cole was compensated with a seat in the Seanad.

“The funny thing is, it would have been likely that if unionists couldn’t get representatives through to Stormont – as unionist seats in Monaghan and East Donegal could have been battleground seats, as compensation Ulster Unionists could have given them seats in the [Stormont] Senate. So the same thing that happened in our timeline could have happened in this alternate timeline, which is tragic in itself, that even with the change in boundary, the same fate would have happened.”

In Dr Beckton’s informed opinion, Cavan’s electorate couldn’t have sustained an electoral benefit for the unionist project within the context of a nine county Northern Ireland.

“Even with all the gerrymandering unionists would not have gained control of the majority of councils or county council, or even town councils. They could have controlled two rural councils, one in the east and one in the west of the county, but even in that situation that would have been at best. So it’s very unlikely they would have had any kind of control for that long. The problem is that Cavan protestants were not like north Monaghan or east Donegal – they weren’t concentrated in one part of the county, they are quite spread.

“That’s one of the reasons why they didn’t stand any candidates in 1918 – they nearly considered it in west Cavan – the grand master of Cavan Orange Order nearly stood in 1918 in West Cavan, but since the Irish Parliamentary Party didn’t stand, he didn’t stand, because there wasn’t a split in the [nationalist] vote.”